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PREFACE 
This Egmont Paper is essentially a reduced version of a 180-page study under-
taken during 2004 under the auspices of the UN University’s Comparative
Regional Integration Studies Programme (UNU-CRIS). Our thanks go to both
UNU-CRIS for making the project possible and also to the Royal Institute for
International Relations for proceeding with this shorter version. Our apprecia-
tion also to the VUB Institute of European Studies for its on-going support of
the project and to the Government of Belgium which has recently extended
funding for its continuation.
This shorter paper will, no doubt, be perused by a larger number of readers than
the longer version, yet the latter contains much background material that illu-
minates more clearly what has been included here, both in analysis and prescrip-
tion. It is our hope that many colleagues will be encouraged to undertake our
longer, and more detailed, ‘adventure’ into one possible future of ‘security
regionalism’. 
The aim of the paper is to explore the history and the future potential of the
‘regional-global mechanism’ for maintaining international peace and security. It
is based on the recognition, accorded by the international community over the
past decade, of the need for greater involvement by regional agencies in conflict
prevention and management in all regions, in co-operation with the United
Nations. 
It is clear that regionalism – drawing on the so-called ‘new regionalism’ of recent
decades – is in the ascendancy, including in the area of peace and security. Where
it fits in the ‘world order’ political system, however, cannot be easily predicted.
Previous and present world order systems – early multipolarity (1919-39); bipo-
larity (1948-90); unipolarity (1990 –2004) – have rested on certain underlying
features of the international community. Whether the future system of the early
21st century will feature regionalism as an alternative to unipolarity or as a com-
ponent part of a broader multilateralism remains to be seen but it is likely that
the latter will be the case. The judgement of the international community today
appears to be that the rise of regionalism as a component of multilateralism is
both desirable and feasible – and even necessary. This is a far cry from the judge-
ment entered by one UN scholar only a decade ago, that ‘regional authorities
generally lack the credibility, the capacity and, hence, the clout to act effectively
as agents for collective security and peaceful settlement’. 
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The rise in regionalism is what underpins the stated vision of the UN Secretary-
General, of a ‘mutually-reinforcing regional-global mechanism’ for peace and
security. Indeed, whether it is desirable or not is perhaps secondary to the fact
that regionalisation is an objective feature of our time – an ongoing multifaceted
phenomenon to which nation-states and the United Nations have no choice but
to respond and adapt. 
We live in fluid and dangerous times, with the traditional principles and precepts
of security thinking that have marked the UN era to date under serious strain.
The concern expressed by the Secretary-General in September 2003 over the
pressures recently placed on our contemporary doctrines and institutions needs
to be heeded carefully. That concern prompted him to establish the UN High-
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change whose report has just been
released.
The Panel's report will shape the lines of a critical debate on the future global
order for perhaps the next half-century. Our original study, completed in Sep-
tember 2004, contained prescriptive comment based on an expanded Security
Council of 25 members. This shorter version has adjusted the analysis to a
Council of 24, which is the size recommended by the Panel. 
The future of 'security regionalism', and in particular the regional dimension of
Security Council reform, will feature prominently in the debate on the Panel's
report, leading up to the UN 'summit meeting' in September 2005. It is our hope
that this paper will make a useful contribution to that.
Dr. Kennedy Graham, Project Director
Ms. Tânia Felício, Project Researcher
UNU-CRIS, Bruges,
January 2005
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INTRODUCTION
‘I believe we can develop a new vision of global security. A vision that
respects human rights while confronting the threats of our age, including
the threat of terrorism. A vision that draws upon the resources and legit-
imacy of a network of effective and mutually reinforcing multilateral
mechanisms – regional and global – that are flexible and responsive to
our rapidly changing and integrating world.’
H.E. Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations, July 2003.
 ‘The fact is, however, that the Security Council does not deal with all
regional arrangements on the same footing. While the Council may give
a particular regional organization an opportunity to assist in preventing
or settling a crisis, it may ignore another regional organization in a simi-
lar situation. We believe that the proper functioning of the international
collective security system in the coming years will require the Council’s
efficient use of assistance by the regional organizations in addressing var-
ious crises.’
H.E. Amr Moussa, Secretary-General of the Arab League, April 2003.
These two quotes, one by the UN Secretary-General, the other by one of his
counterparts from a regional organization, capture the essence of the security
challenge facing the world in the early 21st century. One offers a vision of a
future security system that is holistic and global in nature, emphasising the con-
cept of legitimacy that can come ‘only from the United Nations’. The other cri-
tiques the Security Council for alleged inconsistency in its political judgements,
tagging the future vision with a prerequisite of greater consistency and imparti-
ality on the part of the global body. The essential themes implicit – flexibility
and pragmatism on the one hand and impartiality and consistency on the other
– testify to the nuanced judgement and careful calibration of operations that will
be required if what might be called the future ‘regional-global security mecha-
nism’ is to realise its potential. 
Dialectical only in their prima facie relationship, the two themes are in fact
mutually reconcilable. Only by combining flexibility with impartiality, and
pragmatism with consistency, will the endemic uncertainties and occasional ten-
sions between the global body responsible for international peace and security
and the regional agencies that are meant to play a supporting role in that
endeavour be defused and the global-regional dialectic, in turn, be synthesised.
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The aim of this Egmont Paper is to explore the history and the future potential
of the ‘regional-global mechanism’ for maintaining international peace and
security. It is based on the recognition accorded by the international community
over the past decade of the potential for greater involvement by regional agen-
cies in conflict prevention and management in all regions, in co-operation with
the United Nations.
The metamorphosis in the nature of regionalism – from its almost exclusively
economic and defence dimensions, from the 1940s to the 1980s, towards a com-
prehensive multi-sectoral movement of the 1990s involving political, cultural,
economic and security issues in the broadest contemporary sense – is transform-
ing international organizations as regions develop an integrated skein of mutual
interests among member states. But much of this, most particularly in the area
of security, has been ad hoc and haphazard. The challenge of the next decade is
to replace this improvised, politically-selective, resource-skewed approach to
regionalism with a more planned, consistent yet flexible, and resource-balanced
style of regional and global governance – most especially on the part of the UN
Security Council. 
The paper undertakes four tasks:
• It reviews the relationship between regional and global dimensions of
peace and security, tracing the constitutional and institutional devel-
opment of regional agencies;
• It analyses the regional security mechanism, identifying the complex-
ities inherent in the contemporary scene, and introducing a ‘typology
of security regionalism’ to understand it better;
• It reflects on the multidimensional nature of regional security – the
cultural, political and legal dimensions – and draws conclusions from
the above descriptive and analytical parts;
• It concludes with some prescriptive views, and recommendations, on
how to construct a ‘regional-global mechanism’ in the future, to
answer to the Secretary-General’s vision.
Two fundamental propositions are put forward: that the UN agree upon a set
of, perhaps eight, ‘security regions’, and that an ‘associated chapter VIII regional
agency’ be identified to represent each one in the Security Council. Such an
arrangement would have far-reaching implications for Security Council reform. 
egmont-papers-nr.4.book  Page 6  Friday, January 14, 2005  9:43 AMREGIONAL SECURITY AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
7
1. REGIONALISM IN CONTEXT: 
CONSTRUCTING THE ARCHITECTURE OF PEACE
I. The Historical Development
Throughout history human societies of every size and type have sought, above
all, to ensure their own security and safety. The building of what has become
termed an ‘architecture of peace’ has been the institutional aspiration through
which humanity might avoid warfare and live together. In the modern Westphal-
ian era of the past four centuries, nation-states have sought, in various ways, to
construct that ‘architecture of peace’. 
Prior to the 20th century, regional security represented the height of political
statecraft and diplomatic strategy. Global security – the notion of the world
acting as one unit for its own safety and redemption – was a concept yet unborn
beyond, at least, the philosophical realm of Kantian idealism. The 19th century
witnessed efforts at forging continental peace through state policy in two
regions – Europe and America. Elsewhere, traditional polities of vast size and
periodic civilizational zenith were subjected to imperial sway by European pow-
ers in the late Westphalian era. 
The first attempt to prevent war and preserve international peace on a global
scale, laid down in the League of Nations Covenant in 1919, rested on four
fundamental principles: non-aggression and pacific settlement, collective secu-
rity, minimum arms levels, and self-determination. The limitations of the League
were three-fold – the right of a state to resort to war in the event pacific settle-
ment was unsuccessful; the universal veto on decision-making thwarting con-
sensus in crisis situations; and the voluntary nature of military contributions to
enforcement action. These weakened the collective security mechanism, and the
League collapsed in the face of repeated aggression by some Member States.
Global collective security was strengthened in the second experiment of the mid-
20th century with the United Nations. Building on the Covenant, the Charter of
1945 laid down the fundamental precepts on which the modern ‘security archi-
tecture’ of the international community continues to rest, over half a century
later. ‘War’ was completely abolished, with an effective enforcement mecha-
nism, at least in theory. The veto on enforcement decisions was confined to the
five ‘great powers’ only rather than all member states. And military contribu-
tions from member states for enforcement action became compulsory.
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In the six decades of the UN era, however, collective security has not functioned
in the untrammelled manner envisaged by the Charter’s framers. The advent of
nuclear weapons made the multilateral dimension of collective security asym-
metrical, while the ideological divisions between the US and USSR polarised the
international community and effectively paralysed the Security Council for over
40 years. And, although inter-state conflict declined, intra-state conflict con-
comitantly increased as a result of post-colonial tensions exacerbated by the
intensifying pace of global change. 
Through this period strategic stability at the global level was effectively secured,
albeit precariously, through bipolar nuclear deterrence. For its part the UN
sought to improvise and adapt conflict resolution and management techniques
to the facts on the ground. From the mid-1950s to the early-‘90s ‘classical peace-
keeping’ was employed by the UN (with informal reference to ‘chapter six-and-
a-half’ of the Charter), the UN peacekeepers verifying mutually agreed cease-
fires following a truce with the consent of the belligerent parties. Over the past
decade ‘robust peacekeeping’ has complemented its ‘softer’ counterpart, with
UN or UN-authorised forces engaging in enforcement action for civilian protec-
tion or humanitarian issues.
II. The Contemporary Challenge
The developments of the past few years have placed a severe strain on many of
the traditional principles and tenets of multilateral security. The ‘architecture of
peace’, is in need of redesign. Specifically, five fault-lines are running beneath the
main principles of the contemporary security system: 
• The principle of the non-use of force is challenged by the doctrine of
‘pre-emption’ in a ‘just war’. 
• The principle of domestic jurisdiction is undergoing a far-reaching
metamorphosis as a result of the controversial doctrine of ‘humanitar-
ian intervention’ of the 1990s, refashioned in a more acceptable form
in the doctrine of a ‘responsibility to protect’. 
• The traditional doctrine of recognition has been challenged by the
forced ‘regime change’, in 2003, of a recognised government of a
member state without explicit UN authorisation. 
• The principle of the concurrence of the permanent members of the
Security Council has been challenged by the notion of an ‘unreasona-
ble veto’ developed in February 2003 during the Iraq crisis. 
• The right under customary law of all states to possess weaponry
(including WMD) that they deem necessary for their self-defence, and
egmont-papers-nr.4.book  Page 8  Friday, January 14, 2005  9:43 AMREGIONAL SECURITY AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
9
to enter into and withdraw from disarmament treaties, has been
replaced by a new norm – the doctrine of ‘compulsory but selective
disarmament’.
The UN Secretary-General has recently brought these, and other, tensions to the
surface of diplomatic debate at the United Nations. In April 2003, he called for
the UN and regional organizations to ‘redouble their efforts’ to ensure peace.
The ‘feeling of insecurity’, he said in September, had seldom, if ever, been greater.
We could no longer take it for granted that our multilateral institutions were
strong enough to cope with all of the challenges facing them. Some institutions
might be in need of ‘radical reform’. The relevance of current multilateral rules
and institutions had come into question. It was ‘vitally important’ not to allow
recent differences to persist, and to find a unity of purpose based on a ‘common
security agenda’ with a global consensus on, and response to, the major threats.
‘Radical changes are needed. … History is a harsh judge – it will not forgive us
if we let this moment pass’. 
Acting on his own concerns, the Secretary-General established a 'High-Level
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change', with a mandate to examine the land-
scape of peace and security, 'broadly defined'; to identify the contribution of
collective action in addressing the major challenges and threats; and to recom-
mend changes necessary to 'ensure effective collective action, especially by the
United Nations'.
The Panel's report, released in December 2004, contains substantive and far-
reaching proposals designed to settle the 'security debate' and facilitate a com-
mon security agenda, with global consensus over threat perceptions and agree-
ment over an effective collective response and a reformed United Nations
Organization. In short, the Panel has recommended the following:
Collective security: Collective security rests on three pillars: collective
vulnerability (today's threats recognise no national boundaries); national
limitations (no State can by its own efforts dispel that vulnerability); and
national fallibility (it cannot be assumed that every State will always be
able, or willing, to meet its responsibilities to protect its own peoples and
not harm its neighbours). We all share responsibility for each other's
security, and the test of global consensus will be action.
Threat Perception: The world faces six clusters of threats: economic and
social; inter-State conflict; internal conflict; spread of certain weaponry;
terrorism; and transnational crime.
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Development as Conflict Prevention: Development is the indispensable
foundation for a collective security system.
Use of Force: No charter amendment is needed concerning the use of
force. 
 The self-defence provision (article 51) needs neither extension nor
restriction of its long-understood scope. As in the past, a threat-
ened State can take military action as long as (i) the threatened
attack is imminent; (ii) no other means would deflect it; and (iii)
the action is proportionate. A State may therefore act in anticipa-
tory self-defence on a pre-emptive basis, including against a threat
of terrorism.
 The collective security provision empowering the Security Council
to authorise any other military action is also adequate, with the
language of chapter VII inherently broad enough. No State may
take preventive action against, for example, acquisition of nuclear
weapons-making capability, in the name of anticipatory self-
defence; such action needs Security Council authorization. But the
Council may need to be more proactive in this respect in future.
 In deciding whether to authorize force, the Council should system-
atically address five criteria: seriousness of threat; proper purpose;
last resort; proportional means; and balance of consequences. The
international community has a 'responsibility to protect' the citi-
zens of any State, including through intervention, if its government
is unable or unwilling to protect its own people from 'avoidable
catastrophe' (genocide or other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing
or serious violations of humanitarian law).
Security Council Reform: Security Council reform should meet four prin-
ciples: membership for 'contributing countries'; representativeness; effec-
tiveness; and accountability. The Council should expand to 24 members.
Peace-building: A Peace-building Commission should be established to
identify and assist fragile States. 
Regional Co-operation: Consultation and co-operation between the UN
and regional organizations should be expanded and could be formalized
in an agreement. But authorization from the Council for regional peace
operations is necessary in all cases.
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2. REGIONALISM UNDER CONSTRUCTION – 
DEVELOPING A ‘REGIONAL-GLOBAL 
SECURITY MECHANISM’ 
The structural relationship between the Security Council and the regional organ-
izations is fundamental to the success of a future ‘regional-global security mech-
anism’. The construction of such a mechanism in the multilateral era is best
understood as comprising three distinct periods: shaping the constitutional rela-
tionship (1919-45); building the institutional network (1946-91); and develop-
ing a framework for co-operation (1992-2004). The constitutional, institutional
and co-operation phases of the development of the mechanism bring us to the
present time – a third ‘moment of opportunity’.
I. The Constitutional Phase
The fundamental relationship between universalism and regionalism in security
doctrine has been slowly shaped in the two formative moments of institutional
planning – 1919 and the early- and mid-1940s. The deliberations over both the
League and the UN have laid the foundations for the present system.
In one sense the security arrangement embodied by the League was, to some
extent, an essentially regional affair, being wrought in the aftermath of the Great
War in Europe and designed to prevent any repetition thereof – with the same
approach being applicable to Latin America. Overall, however, regionalism
played no significant role in the League’s attempts at conflict resolution and
management, ill-fated as they were.
In the early planning for a new world organization during World War II, the
issue of ‘security regionalism’ became a matter of dispute. The preliminary out-
line of an ‘interim UN’ envisaged 26 member states, with an Executive Commit-
tee of nine, comprising the Big Four which had ‘policing duties’ (US, UK, USSR
and China) and five ‘regional representatives’. The ‘regional nature’ of such an
Executive Committee, however, was subsequently opposed by a majority in the
US planning team, and the outline was dropped. The principle of regionalism
was subsequently at various times ‘in’ and ‘out’ of the planning, and at the San
Francisco conference in May 1945 the choice between regionalism and univer-
salism became a major point of controversy. Most delegations favoured region-
alism, led by the Latin American bloc and the Arab states, with support from
Britain and its commonwealth and also the USSR, but the US remained stead-
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fastly opposed. The resulting compromise proved to be fateful – introduction
into the Charter of the principle of the ‘inherent right of individual and collec-
tive self-defence’ against armed attack. The aim was to convince ‘regionalists’ of
their freedom, under a centralised system, to respond to aggression from outside
their region without being hobbled by any Security Council stalemate. In the
view of some, article 51 saved the international community from a dire Cold
War fate, but the self-defence article was to have enormous repercussions for the
way in which international security is prosecuted.
The final provisions agreed upon in the Charter reflect what has been called a
‘mild discouragement’ of regionalism. The Charter allows for regional security
arrangements for the maintenance of peace and security as a support to the
primary role exercised by the Security Council. Nothing is to preclude the exist-
ence of regional agencies for dealing with international peace and security as are
appropriate for regional action, provided they are compatible with the purposes
and principles of the Charter. But this was not provided for through any prefab-
ricated mechanism. Instead, the Charter made provision for a vaguely appre-
hended regionalism, with regional agencies or arrangements encouraged to take
initiatives in pacific settlement but with enforcement only to be undertaken on
the authorisation of the Council.
II. The Institutional Phase
The forty-year period of the Cold War paralysed the functional operation of the
Security Council and thus the development of any ‘regional-global security
mechanism’. It was during this period, however, that the decolonisation process
occurred, accompanied by the growth of regional agencies in virtually all
regions of the world. The 1940s saw their establishment in the two regions
where the political consciousness of ‘regionalism’ was most developed at that
time – Latin America and the Arab world – the most vocal proponents of
regional security during the ‘constitutional phase’. This was followed in the
1950s with a burst of unparalleled creativity in regional institution-building in
Europe. 
The ineluctable process of regionalisation continued through the ensuing three
decades. Once the decolonisation process had run its course in Africa and Asia
in the 1960s and the Caribbean and the Pacific in the ‘70s, supplemented by
‘latecomers’ in the ‘80s and the newly-independent states of Central Asia in the
‘90s, a global network of regional (and sub-regional) agencies was finally in
place. 
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III. The Co-operation Phase
Concomitantly with the development of the global ‘fabric of peace’ developed
during the 1990s, the UN began to act on the recognition of the potential for
greater involvement of regional agencies in a co-operative relationship with the
UN in the pursuit of international security. A series of meetings has been held
since the mid-1990s designed to develop a strategic partnership between the
global body and the regional agencies. This has taken two forms: a series of
high-level meetings between the UN Secretary-General and regional organiza-
tions, and two general meetings between the Security Council and regional
organizations. 
It is clear that the UN is serious in seeking to develop a ‘regional-global security
mechanism’ for the 21st century. Two phenomena in particular characterise to
date the experience in strategic planning for that goal: increased interest from
the ‘regionals’ themselves and the development of a normative framework of co-
operation between them and the UN. 
In April 2003, the Security Council met, under Mexican presidency, for the first
time with regional agencies. Only six organizations attended (AU, ECOWAS,
EU, LAS, OSCE and OAS) under the theme ‘The Security Council and Regional
Organizations: Facing New Challenges to International Peace and Security’. The
objective of the meeting was to engender an ‘interactive dialogue’ between the
Council and regional organizations, marking perhaps a ‘new stage’ in interna-
tional relations, since the current situation then prevailing obliged the Council
to identify courses of action that would strengthen international security. 
A second meeting took place in July 2004 under Romanian presidency, this time
with the aim of identifying new methods of co-operation between the UN and
regional organizations and developing innovative approaches to conflict resolu-
tion and stabilization processes. This meeting was attended by seven interna-
tional organizations (AU, CIS, EU, LAS, NATO, OSCE and ECOWAS) and a
Presidential Statement was produced. The Council concluded that regular dia-
logue on specific issues between it and regional organizations would bring ‘sig-
nificant added value’ to UN-regional co-operation for peace and security, based
on ‘complementarity and comparative advantage’. 
Thus, the Security Council has rather belatedly – a decade after the Secretary-
General took the initiative – begun to develop a relationship with the regional
and sub-regional organizations that is focusing on the range of peace and secu-
rity challenges – counter-terrorism, conflict prevention and management, and
peace-building. 
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3. COMPLEXITIES OF REGIONALISM
The development of the ‘regional-global security mechanism’ is hampered by an
array of complexities. These pertain to uncertainties over the meaning of the
central concepts of ‘region’, ‘agency’ and ‘arrangement’; the structural duplica-
tion of regional agencies and other organizations (involving overlapping of
membership); contention over the area of application of their functions; and
ambiguity over their objectives (involving, inter alia, improvised and occasion-
ally competing mandates). 
The UN Charter does not define ‘region’, its framers having decided, after much
fruitless effort, against any self-restricting ordinance of that kind. A definition
advanced during the San Francisco Conference however, gives as good a concep-
tual notion as is perhaps necessary: 
‘There shall be considered, as regional arrangements, organizations of a perma-
nent nature, grouping in a given geographical area several countries which, by
reason of their proximity, community of interests or cultural, linguistic, histori-
cal or spiritual affinities make themselves jointly responsible for the peaceful
settlement of any disputes which may arise.’
Having regard to the various considerations pertaining to both ‘region’ and
‘arrangements or agencies’, an authoritative definition has been advanced as
follows: 
‘A union of states or an international organization, based upon a collective
treaty or a constitution and consistent with the purposes and principles of the
United Nations, whose primary task is the maintenance of peace and security
under the control and within the framework of the United Nations.’1
The membership of regional agencies and similar organizations is bewilderingly
complex, as an analysis of UN regional economic commissions, regional integra-
tion bodies and electoral groupings at the UN reveals. This begs the question of
what constitutes a ‘region’ and indeed, what is a truly meaningful concept of
1. Adapted from Bruno Simma, The United Nations Charter: A Commentary (OUP,
Oxford; 1995), p. 699. The reference to ‘peace and security’ is altered to be primus inter
pares rather than exclusive, since regional organizations such as the African Union are
developing general competencies. Strictly, moreover, it should be noted that regional
organizations, not being an integral part of the UN system, operate perhaps ‘within the
framework of’ the United Nations but not under its ‘control’ – apart from the require-
ment of enforcement authorisation.
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‘region’. It is, in this respect, difficult to posit the most appropriate and author-
itative departure-point for gaining clarity over geographical regionality.
The area of application of a regional agency or other international organization
has also become an increasingly contentious issue. The phenomenon in recent
years of some organizations operating ‘out-of-area’ in a ‘hard security’ function
has caused some political controversy but the United Nations appears to be will-
ing for the present to recognise such operations as not only legitimate but wel-
come. This issue is linked to both membership and mandate. It raises first the
question of whether it is appropriate, in a constitutional sense, for a ‘regional
agency’ under chapter VIII to operate outside the national territories of its own
regional members. 
An analysis of the same organizations shows also overlapping mandates of those
that seek to ‘partner’ with the United Nations in peace and security, inferred
from their statutory objectives. The question of mandate of regional arrange-
ments and agencies is problematic – some pertain to economic issues, some to
security, and some to broader political and cultural ‘identity’ purposes. Thus it
can be seen that the evolution of regional and other organizations has given rise
to some unusual developments regarding mandates. Some organizations have
experienced ‘mandate creep’ through force of circumstance, entering the field of
peace and security from the vantage-point of an economic mandate. Others have
taken on what might be called ‘mandate crab’, ranging laterally across geo-
graphic space, broadening and extending their focal areas. And a few have
undertaken actions that reflect ‘mandate stray’ – effectively exceeding their con-
stitutional authority in certain cases beyond the confines of the UN Charter.
There is a need for greater clarity and order in the matter of mandates in the
regional-global mechanism for peace and security.
I. Effect on UN Security Planning: 
The ‘Strategic Choice’
There thus exists a rather confusing admixture of regional and sub-regional
agencies, with different membership, statutory mandates in peace and security,
together with other organizations with qualitatively different mandates, all
assembling together for meetings with the United Nations over the maintenance
of international peace and security. This invites institutional confusion; indeed
it almost institutionalises that confusion in a divided world. 
The international community faces a ‘strategic choice’ with regard to the rela-
tionship between universalism and regionalism. A partnership has been built up
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between the United Nations and other international organizations in the name
of regionalism but that relationship is complex, informal and constitutionally
invertebrate. The choice is between two future courses. The United Nations can
continue with ‘business-as-usual’ in which several score entities partner with it
but with little clear sense of common direction. Or it can commence the process
of clarifying, and to some extent formalising, the relationship with a view to
making it more effective.
As noted, the UN High-Level Panel supports expanded co-operation with
regional organizations, possibly including a formalized agreement. If UN Mem-
ber States endorse this recommendation, that is the strategic direction in which
the international community will head over the next decade or so.
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4. A TYPOLOGY OF SECURITY REGIONALISM
If the Secretary-General’s vision of a ‘regional-global security mechanism’,
endorsed by both the Security Council and regional organizations, is to have real
meaning, the shape of that mechanism will need substantive content. This
requires, as a prerequisite, some analytical clarity. The essential concept in that
mechanism is ‘regionality’. The first requirement, therefore, is to reach a com-
mon understanding over the concept of ‘region’ for the purposes of international
peace and security – that is, to develop a structure for identifying ‘security
regions’. The three dimensions mentioned earlier (membership, focal area and
mandate) lay the basis for analysis of the regional activity to date and the pros-
pects for developing a ‘regional-global security mechanism’ in the future. 
I. Membership: 
Organizations Involved in Peace and Security
Concerning the organizations themselves, the Security Council has identified
three categories – international organizations, regional and sub-regional – but
the UN Secretariat itself has not developed any such classification in its high-
level meetings. There needs to be some greater clarity in distinguishing interna-
tional organizations for the purpose of applying chapter VIII. 
It may be useful, therefore, to distinguish in this respect between six types of
international organization:
• Global:  Universal or near-universal membership from all world
regions
• Trans-national: Membership from all or many regions of the world
but whose membership is confined to a selective criterion that pre-
cludes universality (political, religious, cultural);
• Cross-Regional: Operational focus on one region but whose member-
ship extends beyond it;
• Regional:  Operational focus on a region and whose membership
equates totally or near-totally with the region, with no external mem-
bership.
• Sub-Regional: Operational focus on a sub-region within a ‘parent
region’, and whose membership equates totally or near-totally with
the sub-region, with no external membership.
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• Cross-Sub-Regional: Operational focus on a sub-region but whose
membership extends beyond the sub-region to include other members
with (but not beyond) the ‘parent region’.
II. Focal Area: Geographical Application 
of the Mandate
The second area of uncertainty concerns the geographical territory for which the
organization is responsible. Some organizations have a clearly-defined area of
application; others do not. Some are clearly intended to have global scope in
their area of application; others have regional or sub-regional area focus. 
This issue is closely comparable to the membership typology. The difference is,
however, that some organizations may have a focal area that extends beyond
their precise membership. This is important for distinguishing between those
with a genuine ‘internal focus’ and those that may have an ‘external focus’ as
well – a distinction that has important implications for any partner relationship
with the UN. 
III. Mandate: Issues of Terminology and 
Charter Provisions
In the broader sweep of institutional development of the ‘architecture of peace’
the art of conflict prevention and management remains rudimentary and impre-
cise. Two shortcomings afflict the current state of the art. There remains some
conceptual overlap and confusion in the terminology employed. And in some
cases the relationship of UN operations to a precise Charter provision remains
unclear. 
In the current terminology the fundamental distinctions are between peacekeep-
ing, peace-enforcement and collective security. 
Peacekeeping is now seen as of two kinds: ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’. The
former pertains to verification of mutually-agreed ceasefires following a truce
and with the consent of the belligerent parties (a tool for conflict containment
where force is to be used only in self-defence). The latter involves more complex,
multidimensional mandates that extend beyond ceasefire verification to encom-
pass a broad range of post-conflict activities and that extend to the use of force
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beyond self-defence – the ‘robust’ enforcement mandates required to enforce
peace agreements against ‘minor order challenges’. 
Some peacekeeping missions have a peace enforcement dimension, and thus the
concepts of peacekeeping and peace enforcement can overlap, with important
constitutional consequences. Indeed, if ‘traditional peacekeeping’ is seen as part
of chapter VI of the Charter, then regional agencies are free to undertake such
missions on their own initiative under article 52 and without Security Council
authorization. A ‘peace enforcement’ mission however, is part of Chapter VII
and a regional agency can only undertake it under Security Council authoriza-
tion (article 53).
Peace-enforcement is a complex and politically controversial concept. It is essen-
tially to be seen as a tool for governing and implementing a peace agreement.
Coined in the 1992 report ‘Agenda for Peace’ to fill the void between the pacific
settlement activities (Chapter VI) and inter-state collective security measures
(Chapter VII), it was envisaged as the more controlled response to military force
against ‘threats of a lesser order’. The concept is, however, fraught with difficul-
ties, since the UN was prevented from developing its own peace enforcement
units. The negative experiences with ‘peace-enforcement’ using traditional
national military contingents in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Somalia soured the
concept, prompting a policy reversal by the United States from support for, to
antipathy towards, UN peace enforcement. Thus the trend in recent years has
been away from reliance on UN-commanded peace enforcement operations in
favour of ‘hybrid operations’ in which the UN and other international organi-
zations co-operate in various ways over the same mission.
Separate from the UN peace enforcement missions are military operations
authorised by the UN to use force (‘all necessary means’) to achieve a stated
objective without the necessary consent of the parties to a conflict. These oper-
ations however, usually act as precursors to subsequent UN peacekeeping mis-
sions, and may parallel them providing the ‘hard security’ protection for a ‘soft’
UN mission, and are entirely under the control of the participating States and
not under UN command. 
Finally, the concept of collective security pertains to traditional inter-state con-
flicts, comprising ‘aggression’ or ‘breach of the peace’, of the kind that preceded
the UN and for which it was fundamentally designed to handle. Such UN-
authorised military operations have been very rare (only two having occurred in
the UN’s history – against North Korea in 1950 and Iraq in 1990).
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As noted, ‘Agenda for Peace’ made it clear that a qualitative distinction was to
be drawn between peace enforcement under article 40 and collective security
against armed aggression under article 42. That distinction, however, has not
been strictly maintained by the Council, which never specifies the precise article
under which it is mounting an enforcement action. As a result, the major powers
often afford themselves considerable latitude in interpreting both the constitu-
tional provisions of the Charter and the specific language and meaning of a
Security Council resolution. Thus the distinction between specific operations
authorised by the Council and what is claimed to be ‘legitimate’ or even ‘legal’
can become blurred. Recent examples are Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq.
IV. Implications for Regional Security
These complexities and uncertainties in UN terminology have implications for
regional security. This has coincided with, and been partially reinforced by, the
phenomenon of regional and sub-regional organizations stepping into conflict
situations to fill a void created by the UN’s limitations and national indifference
from the major powers. In the ‘maintenance of international peace and security’,
involving peacekeeping, peace enforcement and collective security, regional
organizations are ranging alongside the United Nations as indispensable strate-
gic partners. 
The inherent differences between regions in cultural, political and security
terms, however, exacerbate the conceptual uncertainties over how peace support
operations of the various kinds required to cope with today’s complex modern
challenges can relate to the Charter provisions in a manner that promotes a
uniform and consistent multilateral policy. 
V. Peace Operations and the Charter: 
A Possible Schema
Some uncertainty also prevails over the precise constitutional context in which
some of the UN peace operations involving ‘regional organizations’ are under-
taken. It might therefore be useful to seek to relate the peace operations hitherto
undertaken to the Charter provisions. The mandate of a ‘regional organization’
falls within chapter VIII, applicable to the entire ‘peace fabric’ (in normal chron-
ological sequence: prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement
and peace building) on a regional, not global basis. Thus, Article 52 covers the
regional dimension of peacemaking (‘pacific settlement’) laid out in chapter VI
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of the Charter, and perhaps by implication, prevention, peacekeeping and peace-
building. Article 53 covers the regional dimension of enforcement laid out in
chapter VII. Thus chapter VIII is the ‘regional microcosm’ of the global ‘fabric
of peace’. 
This typology has important implications for analysing the historical experience
of ‘regional organizations’ in peace and security in the past; and perhaps for
prescribing greater clarity of peace operations in the future as the ‘regional-glo-
bal security mechanism’ is strengthened. Within the context of this three-dimen-
sional matrix – membership, focal area and mandate – it is possible to classify
all the international organizations with which the UN interacts on peace and
security, all the activities they undertake within the context of the Charter, and
all the locations in which those activities are undertaken. 
VI. Formalising the Partnership: The Question of 
Criteria
As noted some confusion exists over precisely what comprises a regional or sub-
regional organization and, accordingly, what organizations are to be seen as
legitimate partners with the United Nations in the future development of a glo-
bal-regional security mechanism. In the absence of any clear formal definition,
the question arises of what criteria an entity must satisfy before it can be recog-
nised as a ‘regional arrangement or agency’ by the United Nations. Without
some formality and application of criteria, any grouping could, theoretically,
‘gain entry’. They are exogenous to the UN, and any formal ‘acceptance’ of each
for the purposes of Chapter VIII should therefore require a specific and formal
decision by the UN, just as nation-states’ credentials are formally accepted by
the General Assembly before it can become a UN Member State.
Hitherto, four possible ways of classifying ‘regional partners’ with the UN have
been observed: through General Assembly observer status, Secretariat invita-
tion, Security Council appellation and self-proclamation. A detailed analysis
shows that none is sufficient in itself. If the ‘global-regional security mechanism’
is to strengthen and acquire more ‘muscle definition’, there is a need for some
other procedural mechanism for clarifying the partnership status – involving
formal application, clear criteria and transparent decision-making – for devel-
oping the future partnership with the UN. If the ‘strategic choice’ is thus
accepted for a formalisation of the partnership structure of regionalism with the
UN, it would be necessary to develop a distinction between regional agencies for
the purpose of chapter VIII of the Charter and all other international organiza-
tions.
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5. THE MULTIDIMENSIONAL PHENOMENON OF 
REGIONAL SECURITY
Attaining a balance between flexibility and consistency in a future ‘regional-
global security mechanism’ can be achieved if the underlying forces that shape
global security today are fully comprehended. Three dimensions characterising
the distinguishing features of regional security that support global security can
be identified: cultural, political and legal. At bottom lies the cultural dimension:
the need to understand the cultural factors that drive political perceptions and
decision-making from country-to-country and region-to-region. Superimposed
on societal cultures is the political dimension to regional security – the behav-
iour of the major powers within both the global security structure (the UN Secu-
rity Council) and within a regional organization. Such political behaviour, in
turn, addresses the legal issue of whether an action undertaken by a major
power, a regional organization or even the Security Council itself is lawful. Thus
a sound understanding of the cultural, political and legal dimensions of regional
security is essential to any future realisation of the vision of a ‘regional-global
security mechanism’.
I. The Cultural Dimension
Peace, declared the UN General Assembly, is not only the absence of conflict.
Peace requires a ‘positive, dynamic participatory process where dialogue is
encouraged and conflicts are solved in a spirit of mutual understanding and co-
operation’. The vision is thus of a pluralistic global society living harmoniously
and addressing the emerging global problems in a rational, constructive manner.
The fact that, as the Secretary-General observed, ‘we seem no longer to agree on
what the main threats are, or on how to deal with them’ derives from different
world-views held by our various societies that reflect differences in culture and
perceptions. 
The danger that regionalism might dilute global cohesion has always been enter-
tained in the security debate; and this apprehension underpinned the ‘mild dis-
couragement’ of regionalism in the UN Charter negotiations of the 1940s. The
modern interpretation of this issue, however, is more optimistic, regionalist
movements now being considered as ‘moves towards a global order with freer
movement of goods, services, capital, money, people and ideas beyond the con-
fines of the regions’.1
egmont-papers-nr.4.book  Page 22  Friday, January 14, 2005  9:43 AMREGIONAL SECURITY AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
23
The debate over human rights is highly attuned to the issue of culture, having
acquired major significance in national societies and international relations. The
balance between universality and particularity was explicitly captured for the
first time in the 1993 Vienna Declaration, which accorded special recognition to
the societal context of human rights. And successive General Assembly resolu-
tions speak of the sovereign right of each State freely to choose and develop its
political, economic and cultural systems. Most regions have indeed produced
their own human rights charters.
The concept of ‘democracy’ is not to be found explicitly in the UN Charter but
respect for ‘human rights’ and ‘fundamental freedoms’ is one of the UN’s four
stated purposes. Recent developments have emphasised the regional dimension
of democracy. Several international conferences on new or restored democracies
have been held with a conscious regard for regionality. The regions are to adopt
regional declarations or charters ‘that are more catered to the conditions in the
regions’ and that focus on regional collaboration for the promotion and support
of democracy. In April 2004 the UN Human Rights Commission also resolved
to invite regional, sub-regional and other organizations and arrangements to
identify best practice and experience in democracy. 
What does this have to do with the Security Council in its pursuit of interna-
tional peace and security? The underlying issue has to do with the manner in
which societies choose their social and political systems. Cultural domination or
hegemony is often based on the exclusion of subordinate groups. Conflicts are
often fought, ostensibly at least, on the promotion or repudiation of a particular
social and political ideology or system. The task of peace-building, in particular,
in today’s peace theology, draws from the nature of the ‘democratic society’
which the United Nations is bound to promote. It follows that the Security
Council, if it is to take it upon itself to determine whether a particular Member
State in a particular region is failing in its human rights or democratic obliga-
tions, needs to take into account ‘regional particularities’. In the Iraq crisis
(2002-4) the adoption, as a post-invasion rationale, of the goal of promoting
democracy in the Arab world risks overlooking the ‘regional particularities’ of
the area in which the occupying powers became engaged. This included the need
to consult the regional agency (Arab League) whose counsel was against an
exogenously-conceived democracy imposed by force. 
The cultural dimension underpinning a ‘regional-global security mechanism’
will prove critical to the manner in which it develops in future decades. The UN
1. Javier Perez de Cuellar, ‘Our Creative Diversity’, Report of the World Commission on Culture
and Development, (UNESCO Publishing / Oxford & IBH Publishing), 1996, p. 48. 
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Security Council stands to be better informed, at the interface where culture
drives politics, by a more uniform input from regional agencies. Failure to rec-
ognise and acknowledge this, and to act on that acknowledgement, will promise
more difficulty and conflict ahead. This is where culture, human security and
terrorism intersect. 
II. The Political Dimension
The political dimension of regional security essentially concerns the ‘compara-
tive advantage’ of the global and regional approaches to peace and security. Is
the world governed more effectively and more wisely by a single global hegemon
exerting influence over the entire planet or by a number of regional hegemons
performing the same role under delegated authority from the centre? Is global
hegemony or regional hegemony preferable for international stability? Must
they be seen in contradistinction or might they be reconciled within an ‘effective
and mutually reinforcing multilateral mechanism’ for an integrating world? 
The issue of regional hegemony contends with that of global legitimacy. In a
world of ‘perfect regionalism’ each UN Member State would belong to one par-
ticular region. The UN Security Council could delegate responsibility for a con-
flict to one particular regional or sub-regional agency and remain uninvolved,
leaving the agency with an unfettered hand to pursue, to good effect, conflict
resolution and management and report back to the global body. The reality,
however, is different, with an inextricable skein of inter-woven national interests
competing between regional and exogenous states. In particular the position and
role of one superpower, the United States, complicates any ‘perfect regionalism’
in the maintenance of international peace and security, being the only nation-
state that can credibly claim to perceive the whole world as its ‘region’. 
This poses further challenges for the development of a ‘regional-global security
mechanism’. In reality every conflict situation delegated to an agency by the
Council will nonetheless have the US national interest involved, along with
those of the regional hegemon and other regional states. The issue of global and
regional hegemonic legitimacy is not confined to the United States. Some former
colonial powers tend to see it as their ‘responsibility’ to intervene if circum-
stances in a conflict situation strike at what they perceive to be their vital
national interests. Examples are the UK in Sierra Leone, France in Burundi and
Côte d’Ivoire, and Belgium in Rwanda. In each case national political interests
and regional security interests are closely related. 
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A related issue is whether the relativities between ‘security regions’ themselves
and between them and the UN Security Council carry meaning. The political
dimension of regional and global security, for example, inevitably evokes the
issue of permanent representation on the UN Security Council. In the develop-
ment of the ‘regional-global security mechanism’, the power differential
between Member States of the Security Council (both the permanent five and
the elected ten), and between them and regional hegemons, will be a crucial
factor. It is instructive to explore this in assessing the merit of ‘regional represen-
tation’ on the Council in the event of significant Council reform at some stage
in the future.
The Security Council, in 2004, does in fact reflect a clear ‘global primacy’ in
terms of objective realities of military and economic power, financial contribu-
tion and global population. It accounts, on average, for over two-thirds of glo-
bal military expenditure, well over half of the global economy, over half the
financial contributions and two-fifths of the global population. These statistics
are significant in terms of the ever-evolving concept of ‘global legitimacy’. The
proportion of global representation, however, declines progressively from ‘hard’
power (military, and then economic) towards ‘soft power’ (finances, and then
population). This succinctly captures the dilemma of UN reform in the early 21st
century. 
The five permanent members rank high in military spending and financial con-
tributions to peacekeeping. But again, with the ‘new legitimacy’ factor of popu-
lation, and also UN peacekeeping troop contributions, their claims are not
strong. This raises the question whether, in developing the ‘regional-global secu-
rity mechanism’ for the next century, greater regard should perhaps be paid
henceforth to ‘security regionalism’. Whatever the future holds in this respect,
clearly the rise of ‘security regionalism’ is destined to have a powerful effect on
the composition and functioning of the UN Security Council in the 21st century.
The political dimension of regional-global security will need increasingly to take
into account the broader factors of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power, more than has been
the case in the past. 
III. The Legal Dimension
The relationship between politics and the law has always been a tenuous one at
the international level. The extent to which states hew to the strictures of inter-
national law is itself a debatable point. On the one hand they will go to great
lengths to cloak their political and military actions in the flexible garb of legal
precepts. On the other hand governments, and even scholars, are prone to argue
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that the law must adapt to changing political realities, particularly in a time of
flux such as the present. 
In exploring the legal dimension of ‘security regionalism’, the essential distinc-
tion to be drawn is that between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ security. Chapter VIII of the
Charter encourages regional agencies to take initiatives in ‘soft’ security but
imposes tight constraints upon them in ‘hard’ security. Regional agencies may
take initiatives under article 52 in prevention and pacific settlement and peace-
building, but article 53 precludes them from taking such initiatives on their own
in enforcement. Yet how often, and how egregiously, has such enforcement
action been undertaken, in advance of Security Council authorisation? 
In the aftermath of the Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq experiences, there is a
growing tendency in Western circles to distinguish between the ‘legitimate’ and
the ‘legal’. Legal opinions on the merits of national policies in conflict situations
often cover a range of positions reflecting particular political interests. The issue
of armed intervention is, in general, politically controversial and legally contest-
able. Two issues in particular are germane to the constructive development of a
‘regional-global security mechanism’: armed intervention and self-defence. 
Armed Intervention - There is no dispute that interventions with armed force
without Security Council authorisation (explicit or implicit) are a violation of
the Charter and international law. What is more disputable is the occasional
retroactive approval given by the Council. Strictly, retroactive authorisations are
incompatible with the Charter and as such are violations of international law.
The general view advanced by governments is that the primacy of the Security
Council must continue to be upheld, and thus that only advance authorisation
is permissible. The problem, however, is that the Council’s historical record on
this matter does nothing to inspire confidence that it will apply such standards
with any rigour. If the primacy of the Council is to be genuinely reasserted, the
onus will be on the Council itself to ensure that the constitutional provisions
that grant it such far-ranging powers are safeguarded and respected. In a world
of instantaneous telecommunications and continual Council sessions, only
advance Council approval of enforcement action can be accepted.
Self-Defence - The self-defence provision of the UN Charter, article 51, has ‘bal-
looned out’ over the past half-century to become the most oft-cited and flexibly-
interpreted legal justification for armed action. This was never intended by the
framers of the Charter and it is not conducive to the strengthening of the collec-
tive security system. The Security Council was not given explicit provision to
judge the legal, or even the political, validity of a claim of self-defence. Member
States are required simply to notify it of actions taken. Notable examples of
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‘extreme use’ of article 51 include US-led OAS naval quarantine against Cuba
in response to Soviet missile installations (1962); or Israeli and Palestinian
mutual attacks during the second intifada (2000-04). 
The most problematic case of self-defence in recent times concerns the US-led
intervention in Afghanistan. The legal justification for Operation Enduring
Freedom had been SCR 1368, recalling the right of self-defence and the Security
Council’s readiness to ‘take all necessary steps’ to combat all forms of terrorism.
Three years later, however, the Enduring Freedom coalition continues to remain
in Afghanistan with the objective of eradicating terrorism – still under the justi-
fication of self-defence. This raises the question of when a so-called ‘self-
defence’ operation might be seen to have lapsed. Article 51 allows the right of
self-defence only until such time as the Council has taken ‘necessary measures’
to maintain the peace. No criteria have been developed by the UN Security
Council for judging either the original validity of a self-defence operation or the
time-limit. But in the case of Afghanistan, the Council had, by early 2002, taken
such measures through ISAF and UNAMA, yet, three years later, the self-defence
operation against terrorism through Enduring Freedom continues. It may be
contended that the justification for Operation Enduring Freedom has switched
from US ‘self-defence’ to an Afghanistan ‘request’ for continuation of the oper-
ation. If this is the case, it simply highlights the lack of transparency in such
matters and the need for a practice whereby requests for foreign troop presence
should be notified to the Security Council. Perhaps such requests should even be
subject to Council approval – as is implicitly the case with Council resolution
1559 of September 2004 regarding Syria’s presence in Lebanon.
A variant of self-defence is the ‘protection of nationals’ policy, which has been
used to justify other cases of armed intervention. This has prompted interven-
tion in a number of Cold War and post-Cold War cases, such as Belgian inter-
vention in DR Congo (1960) or British intervention in Sierra Leone (1997).
Armed intervention for the protection of nationals is generally regarded as a
customary right in international law that long preceded the UN Charter. When
the operation is short and swift and operationally confined to the sole objective
of rescuing specified individuals, it is generally condoned. When it is used as a
cover for the continued presence of foreign troops and the nationals no longer
remain the focus, it clearly violates the Charter. 
A strengthened ‘regional-global security mechanism’, in which regional agencies
would have a more direct input into Security Council deliberations, is likely to
have an effect on the Council’s policy on intervention. As noted earlier the self-
defence article was introduced in response to concerns that the absence of an
effective system of regional security in the UN Charter could leave some regions
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vulnerable to external aggression. The concept of collective self-defence was
thus introduced. But the inclusion in article 51 of individual self-defence as well
as the collective self-defence broadened the issue irremediably. It essentially
accorded the major powers that possess global reach a potential justification for
intervention anywhere.
If conflict management were left to regional agencies rather than to the UN
Security Council, it is likely that self-defence of the traditional kind would be
significantly curtailed. Regional agencies would most probably be more inclined
to look to regional collective security as the means to respond to aggression and
there would, moreover, be less inclination, and certainly less scope, to ‘reach
beyond the region’ in the name of self-defence.
The above considerations, however, pertain to the traditional notion of self-
defence. In the modern age, a novel notion of self-defence has emerged. In a
globalising world where the ‘new realities’ of terrorism and WMD proliferation
make any society anywhere on the planet vulnerable to ‘attack’, the notion of
self-defence has become commensurately global – an attack on buildings in New
York is answered with regime change in Kabul. The unpredictable and lightning
nature of such an attack has also prompted the extension of self-defence, at least
on the part of the United States, to include pre-emptive strikes. 
While neither of these features – global application and pre-emptive action – is
new, the circumstances in which they have been prosecuted in recent years are
new. Pre-emption was traditionally confined to a response to the massing of
armies along a border in times of acute bilateral tension. Today the modern
concept of self-defence is shaped by massive explosions in major world cities,
carrying immediate implications for global stability and evoking an immediate
global response. In such 21st century scenarios the universal role of the UN Secu-
rity Council is self-evident. Regional agencies are subordinate to the need of the
Security Council to marshal a global response to a global threat.
If the aggressive action depicts a globalising world today in both a spatial and a
temporal sense, it is logical that the response will be of the same order. The
individual has entered the international scene and the concept of civilian protec-
tion is undergoing a conceptual transformation from national defence to global
prosecution. The Security Council has the responsibility of responding to inter-
state aggression. But non-state aggression by private groups against states is
relatively new. The question is what is the correct body for responding to attacks
by individuals or groups. The Security Council responds to private aggression
as if it is a refined case of traditional aggression – but a military response to
private aggression is proving to be an inappropriate strategy. There is possibly a
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need to consider another body designed for applying the rule of law – criminal
investigation, apprehension, prosecution and conviction – at the global level.
Regional agencies will have a role in this. Their interaction with the Security
Council on the ‘modern threats’ of terrorism and proliferation is already on the
agenda as a result of the Council’s two meetings in 2003 – the first on counter-
terrorism and the second on ‘new threats’. But the extent to which a stronger
role for regionalism in security affects the issue of ‘self-defence’ depends on the
evolution in the above normative considerations.
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6. CENTRAL FINDINGS
In 1945, the provisions of the UN Charter gave a ‘mild discouragement’ to
regional agencies in the international ‘architecture of peace’. Six decades later,
the President of the Security Council acknowledges the evidence of the contem-
porary era – that it is addressing ‘one of the main issues in modern thinking on
international relations’ when it focuses on the role of regional organizations.
This does not mean that the Charter is to be rewritten – regional security coun-
cils supplanting the central body in power and influence. What it does mean,
however, is that a balance will be sought in which regionalism and universalism
will come to mutual terms, developing the means of effective co-operation to an
extent perhaps even unimagined until now.
It is therefore necessary to develop a clear analytical understanding of the
present state of the UN-regional relationship before giving prescriptive thought
to what might be achieved in the future. In this sense, three central findings must
be drawn:1
I. ’Legitimacy’ 
A flexible and consistent ‘regional-global security mechanism’ is essential to the
legitimacy of the UN Security Council in the 21st century. The Council is evolv-
ing away from its original role as the international community’s instrument for
maintaining peace through responding to inter-state aggression. This trend is
being led by the major powers themselves. With that evolution the objective of
ensuring a balanced input into Council deliberations from all regions, with dif-
ferent historical, cultural and religious backgrounds, changes from an ideal to
an imperative. Even the United States itself is on record as favouring an increas-
ing reliance on regional agencies for peace and security. With the passage of time
a political consensus is likely to develop that increasingly acknowledges this
need, and efforts will commence to shape guidelines and precepts for strength-
ening that mechanism. As the Council continues to evolve into a body of global
governance, its composition will need to reflect not only military power but also
demographic and economic power. 
1. An additional 21 specific findings and conclusions are contained in the longer version of this
paper.
egmont-papers-nr.4.book  Page 30  Friday, January 14, 2005  9:43 AMREGIONAL SECURITY AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
31
II. Burden Sharing
A greater role by regional agencies in peace and security would relieve the
United Nations of part of the burden it currently faces in this area. This would
entail streamlining the relationship regional agencies have with the Security
Council. The way to strengthen and develop the ‘regional-global security mech-
anism’ is to further clarify, and to some extent formalize, the ‘comparative
advantage’ of each ‘partner organization’ in its contribution to international
peace and security under UN auspices.
III. Constitutional Clarity
The principal shortcoming in the fledgling ‘regional-global security mechanism’
in the early 21st century is the constitutional lacuna in the relationship between
the UN and regional agencies. While the UN Charter provides for the existence
of regional agencies and gives broad direction to their functional relationship
with the Security Council, it is silent on their constitutional relationship.
Regional organizations have sprouted around the world independently of the
United Nations and often answer to different political needs and aspirations.
There is therefore a need for greater clarity in the way in which the United
Nations perceives regional agencies, distinguishes them from other international
organizations, formally recognizes them and accords them delegated responsi-
bilities.
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7. CLARIFYING REGIONALISM WITHIN 
COLLECTIVE SECURITY: 
TOWARDS A SCHEMATIC MODEL
For the purpose of clarifying the ‘regional-global security mechanism’, two fun-
damental concepts are advanced for consideration – the identification of ‘secu-
rity regions’ for the maintenance of peace and security; and the identification of
a ‘chapter VIII regional agency’ for each ‘security region’, with roles derived
from chapter VIII of the UN Charter. If these two innovations are developed,
they are likely to have implications for UN Security Council reform.
I. A Structure of ‘Security Regions’
For the purpose of constructing a ‘regional-global mechanism’ that can be effec-
tive in the area of peace and security, it might be useful to arrive at a common
understanding of a ‘region’ for the practical purposes of chapter VIII of the
Charter. To this end it is suggested, as a first fundamental proposal, that a series
of ‘security regions’, contiguous but not overlapping, be identified by the Gen-
eral Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council. 
In determining how such ‘security regions’ might be identified, three factors
would need to be considered. 
•G eography – The Primary Pattern: The departure point for regional-
ism in peace and security, if not the exclusive criterion, has to be geog-
raphy. This delineation would lead to a natural division of the world
in the five geographic continents: Africa, Europe, Asia, Australia and
America. 
• Culture, Ethnicity and Language – The Secondary Pattern: Closely
related to and complicating the primary pattern is the cultural factor,
in particular the location and spread of ethnic groups with their vari-
ous distinguishing characteristics, particularly linguistic and religious.
Historical factors of ancestral migration and contemporary socio-
political engineering have resulted in a dizzying mosaic of the 3,000
or so languages still spoken around the world – especially in areas
where certain regions ‘collide’ or where post-colonial traces of forced
migration linger.
• Geostrategic Politics – The ‘Qualifying Factor’: From this departure
point, issues of geo-strategic politics begin to intrude. Europe’s border
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with Asia is problematic. Should the Pacific, with its vast size, unique
culture yet small and scattered population, be seen as a separate ‘secu-
rity region’? Is North America, distinct culturally and politically with
the rest of the Americas, a separate ‘security region’? Is the Arab
world, straddling two continents and culturally and politically distinc-
tive, naturally a ‘security region’? Is Asia, with its cultural heterogene-
ity and vast population, one or several ‘security regions’? The ‘bound-
aries issue’ – where one ‘security region’ ends and another begins –
must also be addressed, Caucasia and Eastern Europe being the most
problematic cases. 
These geo-strategic and politico-cultural considerations preclude a simple clar-
ity in respect of ‘security regions’. But having regard to the above considera-
tions, the following structure of eight ‘security regions’ is proposed:
• Sub-Saharan Africa
• North Africa-West Asia
•E u r o p e
• Central Asia – Caucasia
•S o u t h  A s i a
•E a s t  A s i a
• Southeast Asia – Pacific
•A m e r i c a
II. A Structure of ‘Chapter VIII Regional Agencies’
If the ‘strategic choice’ is accepted for a formalisation of the ‘partnership struc-
ture’ of regionalism with the United Nations, then it would be necessary to
develop a distinction between regional agencies for the purpose of chapter VIII
of the Charter and all other international organizations. While all organizations
would have a genuine partnership relationship with the UN, the designation of
a ‘chapter VIII regional agency’ would be acknowledged as separate and dis-
tinct. How might this be done? 
The second fundamental proposal of this study is that a set of regional agencies
be identified, corresponding to each ‘security region’. The responsible agency
would be the agency for a region which most closely approximates the full and
exclusive membership of the ‘security region’. A ‘chapter VIII regional agency’
would have two principal roles: institutional and executive.
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- The Institutional Role: A ‘chapter VIII regional agency’ would have two insti-
tutional functions: representation and reporting. The eight ‘chapter VIII
regional agencies’ would replace the anachronistic informal electoral groupings
(still reflecting Cold Ward delineations) and act as the eight-fold institutional
mechanism through which a certain number of UN Member States for each
agency would be elected, including the permanent five. As for the reporting
function, each agency would be responsible, acting either directly or through
one of its Member States on the Security Council, for keeping the Council
informed about the security situation in its ‘security region’. 
- The Executive Role: The executive role would involve acting as an executive
agent on behalf of the Security Council in carrying out the Council’s recommen-
dations (in pacific settlement) and decisions (in enforcement). The existence of
a mechanism for regional pacific settlement would, given the significance of arti-
cle 52 of the Charter, be seen as a necessary condition of a ‘chapter VIII agency’.
But, since article 53 implies that the use of a regional agency for enforcement is
at the discretion of the Council, an enforcement capacity would not be seen as
a necessary condition of a ‘chapter VIII regional agency’. Indeed, enforcement
could be carried out by any international organization – regional, trans-national
or sub-regional – that had the capacity and which the Council might call upon.
Thus NATO, as a trans-regional organization, might undertake enforcement on
behalf of the Security Council, while the African Union as a regional agency or
ECOWAS as a sub-regional agency, might do the same. But in every case, the
advance authorisation of the Council remains mandatory.
III. Identifying Possible ‘Chapter VIII Regional 
Agencies’
In order to identify the agency to be responsible for each security region, three
obvious criteria emerge: membership, mandate and focal area. A fourth crite-
rion might be the operational relationship already developed with the United
Nations. Based on these criteria, there would appear to be four organizations
which would be self-evidently ‘chapter VIII regional agencies’. In two cases,
political care would be required in determining the correct agency. And two
cases would require further political evolution in their development. Thus:
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Cases Requiring Care – Identifying the appropriate 'chapter VIII regional
agency' requires care in two cases.
The issue is particularly difficult for Europe, having regard to the criteria of
membership, focal area, mandate and co-operative links with the UN. The COE
qualifies more genuinely as a pan-European agency than the EU does with
regard to membership and focal area. Neither qualifies, in fact, in terms of man-
date, each lacking a formal internal dispute settlement mechanism. And
although the EU aspires to become a genuine 'global actor' and while the UN is
keen to strengthen an operational partnership with it for enforcement purposes,
it appears that the EU does not consider itself to be a regional agency for the
purposes of chapter VIII1. The COE, however, does engage in 'soft security'
issues of early warning, conflict prevention and peace-building, eschewing any
enforcement capacity. It has developed the concept of 'citizen security' which is
virtually identical to that of 'human security' which is now on the UN agenda.
It could therefore be that the COE might qualify as a 'chapter VIII regional
agency' while co-operating closely with the EU in this role. For its part, it is
likely that the EU has a different, and indeed, unique future as a security partner
with the UN including, one day perhaps, a Council seat as the European Parlia-
ment has proposed. But this would require an evolutionary time-frame as well.
A different issue would arise for South-east Asia-Pacific where two autonomous
regional organizations exist separately for South-east Asia (ASEAN) and the
Pacific (PIF). While there is a plausible reason to perceive the Pacific as a sepa-
Eligibility 'Security Region' Possible 'Chapter VIII Regional Agency'
Self-evident
Sub-Saharan Africa African Union (AU)
North Africa-West Asia League of Arab States (LAS)
Central Asia-Caucasia Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
America Organization of American States (OAS)
Requiring care
Europe Council of Europe/European Union (COE/EU)
Southeast Asia - Pacific Association of Southeast Asian Nations/Pacific
Islands Forum (ASEAN/PIF)
Evolutionary 
South Asia South Asian Assoc. for Reg. Co-op. (SAARC)
East Asia
1. See Dr. Thierry Tardy, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, ‘Limits and Opportunities of UN-EU
Relations in Peace Operations: Implications for DPKO’, External Study for UN DPKO Best Prac-
tices Unit, September 2003, p. 9.
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rate 'security region' with its own separate 'chapter VIII agency', this would
place undue pressure on the distribution of seats in a Council of 24 members.
Given the modest population size of the sixteen Pacific countries (31 million),
the most logical arrangement would be to regard the two areas as one 'security
region'. South-east Asia, with its larger population (530 m.) would naturally be
seen as the larger partner in an institutional sense, with ASEAN thus as the lead
'chapter VIII agency'. This would not preclude the PIF playing a collaborative
role alongside ASEAN, and indeed appearing before the Council on issues of
direct security concern to the Pacific. 
Two Evolutionary Cases – Two 'security regions' would require considerable
evolution in their security self-perceptions. In one case (South Asia) the question
of mandate is a problem, considering that the South Asian Association for
Regional Co-operation (SAARC) would need to adopt a security function before
it assumed such a role in reporting to the Council. In a second case (East Asia)
the complete absence of a regional agency suggests that some time will pass
before this issue is resolved. Yet in November 2004 China proposed an East
Asian Community (albeit including South-east Asia), envisaging both an eco-
nomic and a security function, as a medium-term goal.
Passive States – The problem of overlapping membership constitutes an una-
voidable weakness of any chapter VIII arrangement. A possible solution – that
the overlapping states remain ‘passive’ in one of the agencies – could prove dif-
ficult to implement. No sovereign State could be ‘instructed’ to remain ‘passive’
within an international organization of which it is a full member. In pursuing its
vital interests in regional peace and security, a State must be expected to act with
more-or-less sovereign freedom. Arab countries of North Africa clearly have a
vital stake in the outcome of the Darfur crisis in Sudan, which is the subject
primarily of the AU’s attention. They could not be told to remain ‘passive’ in
that organization on this issue, for example. The concept of ‘passivity’ must
therefore be taken as a relative term; offering guidance to the ‘overlapping
states’ in a second agency. The solution to this problem, to the extent it exists,
would lie in the level of co-operation between the adjacent agencies. In the case
of Sudan, for example, the LAS appears to be co-operating well with the AU. 
Unattached States – At present, the agencies identified (including one putative
body for East Asia) would cover 185 of the 191 UN Member States. Six states
however, stand out – Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran, Israel, Monaco and East-
Timor. Over time four of these are likely to join one of the above regional agen-
cies.1 Two, however (Iran, Israel) are likely to remain sui generis in respect of
1. In October 2004, Monaco joined the Council of Europe.
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security regionalism. The problem of ‘unattached states’, however, is not prohib-
itive. They can be acknowledged to have separate ‘reporting rights’ to the Secu-
rity Council (which are already guaranteed, in any event, under article 35.2 of
the Charter). The only obligation upon them in this respect is an advance accept-
ance of pacific settlement of any dispute which they may be involved in. 
Role of Other International Organizations – Identification of ‘chapter VIII
regional agencies’ leaves open the question of what role other international
organizations might have. As noted, an executive role, especially in enforce-
ment, is not precluded for all other such organizations. In fact, both NATO (a
cross-regional organization) and the EU (sui generis but perhaps seen as a sub-
regional) do not see themselves as regional agencies for the purpose of chapter
VIII. The OSCE has declared itself to be a ‘chapter VIII agency’ yet it is perhaps
more accurately seen as a cross-regional. In any of these cases, the Security
Council is free to call upon them for pacific settlement or enforcement action.
IV. The Constitutional Position of 
the United Nations 
The procedure by which ‘security regions’ and ‘chapter VIII regional agencies’
are identified would itself need to be carefully considered. Constitutionally, the
United Nations is not empowered under the Charter to engage in such a selec-
tion exercise. The regional organizations have emerged through autochthonous
processes, answering to needs and aspirations pertaining more directly to par-
ticular regions than to considerations of global security. 
That is not to say that the two are not closely related or that global and regional
security considerations cannot be satisfactorily reconciled in this respect. But it
does raise the question of which institutions – the global body through the Secu-
rity Council or the regional bodies through relevant organizations – are best
placed to take the initiative to develop such an institutional structure. It would
seem that the Council is the appropriate body to initiate matters – being empow-
ered under the Charter at least to deal with ‘regional agencies’. But it is not so
empowered to ‘direct’ which agencies ‘shall’ form such a structure. The Council
could, perhaps, ‘invite’ certain agencies to develop a closer relationship. The
identification of a regional agency for the purposes of a formal ‘regional part-
nership’ with the United Nations would not be lightly achieved. It would carry
considerable political implications and would need to be handled with discre-
tion. Such a step is, however, possible. 
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V. Implications for Security Council Reform 
The identification of ‘security regions’ and associated ‘chapter VIII agencies’
could have implications for Security Council reform – through the issue of mem-
bership. It is now generally agreed that an enlarged membership is necessary so
that the Council can be more representative and legitimate. Disagreement has
existed, however, over whether there should be more permanent members. Two
developed countries, Germany and Japan, are seeking permanent membership,
but this has opposition both from neighbouring developed countries and from
the South. Suggestions that major countries from the South (such as Brazil, India
and Egypt, and perhaps South Africa or Nigeria) should as well be given perma-
nent membership also encounter opposition from close neighbours. The grant-
ing of the veto to such new permanent members is also contentious.
It is also generally recognized that a new electoral system is needed. One of the
alternative formulae put forward within the UN working group has involved the
idea of regional representation – not ‘direct representation’ in the form of a
regional agency but ‘indirect representation’ through a Member State (the spe-
cific state changing through rotation) representing a region. Five seats have been
proposed, for example, for each of Africa, Asia, Latin America/Caribbean,
Europe and the Arab group. Agreement, however, is proving to be elusive on this
issue as well.
The UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change has recom-
mended an expanded Security Council of 24 members. The Council, unable to
agree on one model of expansion, has offered two models for the consideration
of Member States. Both models envisage membership being distributed accord-
ing to four ‘regional areas’ – Africa; Asia-Pacific; Europe; Americas. Thus:
Model A
Continuation of the P-5 with veto power 5 P
Six new permanent members without veto 6 P
Three extra rotating two-year seats 13 E
24
Model B
Continuation of the P-5 with veto power 5 P
Eight new rotating but renewable four-year seats
(‘semi-permanent’)
8P
Three extra rotating two-year seats 11 E
24
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These models, based as they are on the principle of ‘regionalism’ (for the first
time in the context of the Security Council), offer a potential breakthrough in
what has been a decade-long stalemate in the reform exercise. The Panel does
not, however, explore the country-breakdown of the four regions, the strategic
implications for global security of such regional membership, or the institutional
implications for the regional, sub-regional and other organizations that are
increasingly partnering with the UN in peace and security. While the expansion
to 24 and the principle of regionalism are steps forward, the choice of four large
and disparate regions is a generalised way of applying that principle – which
leaves some strategic and ‘political-cultural’ issues unresolved. 
The Annex to this paper explores these considerations in more detail. The tables
depict the Security Council in three scenarios, viz., according to its current size
and format (15 members); the four ‘regional areas’ in the two models of the
Panel’s report (24 members); and the ‘eight security regions’ and ‘chapter VIII
agencies’ proposed in this paper (24 members).
The criteria used in the Annex to facilitate more detailed consideration rest on
two concepts: the ‘regional state spread’ (RSS) and the ‘regional population
spread’ (RPS). Clearly the democratic dimension of such an expanded Council,
and hence its legitimacy, would be improved through use of a larger number of
(eight) security regions and security agencies. Such an arrangement would also
facilitate the ability of the Council to rely more systematically on regional agen-
cies for monitoring the security situation around the world.
It will be important, however, to avoid unnecessary confusion in the debate on
Council expansion that is about to commence over the next nine months. The
Panel’s identification of four ‘regional areas’ should perhaps be accepted, for the
foreseeable future, as the basis for decisions in 2005-6 on expansion and selec-
tion of new members. But the further identification of eight ‘security regions’
and ‘chapter VIII regional agencies’ is not incompatible with these issues, and
could be explored at a subsequent time and in a more measured, evolutionary,
context – over the next decade.
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8. RECOMMENDATIONS
Nine recommendations are advanced with respect to ensuring greater constitu-
tional clarity in the UN-regional organization relationship, refinement of the
‘guiding principles’, and reformulation of some doctrinal precepts of the global
security system. 
1. Identification of ‘Security Regions’
The General Assembly, on the recommendation of the Security Council,
could identify specific and separate ‘security regions’ for the ‘regional-
global security mechanism’ – that do not overlap and which encompass
virtually every UN member state.
2. Identification of ‘Chapter VIII Regional Agencies’
The General Assembly, on the recommendation of the Security Council,
could identify one ‘responsible regional agency’ for each ‘security region’
whose membership is coterminous with the states located in the ‘security
region’ and which are accorded special ‘chapter VIII responsibilities’ –
each to be regarded as a ‘chapter VIII regional agency’. It would be under-
stood that this would be an evolutionary exercise, with the Council iden-
tifying those regional agencies that meet the stipulated criteria as and
when appropriate.
3. Acceptance of Selected Organizations as ‘UN Partners for Peace’
The Security Council could introduce an arrangement of ‘UN Partners for
Peace’ with the designated agencies of ‘security regions’, and other
selected international organizations.
4. Constitutional Principles
The General Assembly could consider adopting, on the recommendation
of the Security Council, a set of ‘constitutional principles’ for the partner-
ship between the UN and regional agencies and other international
organizations.
5. A ‘Consultative Framework’
A ‘Consultative Framework’ could be established to govern the strategic
and planning relationship between the United Nations and all partner
organizations in peace and security.
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6. Implementation
The United Nations could, as the first step in the ‘Partnership for Peace’,
commence a process with regional agencies and other partners to ensure
more effective implementation of the ‘functional principles’ of co-opera-
tion in conflict prevention and peace-building.
7. Regional Reviews
The Secretary-General could invite regional agencies to undertake a
review of the security situation in their region and its relationship to the
global security situation, focusing in particular on the threats and chal-
lenges faced by the international community in the 21st century.
8. A ‘Regional Peace and Security’ Concept
The UN Security Council could distinguish more clearly between a ‘threat
to regional peace and security’ and a ‘threat to international peace and
security’.
9. Security Council Reform
The General Assembly could consider exploring the implications of
regionalism for Security Council reform, through allocating permanent
membership to the ‘chapter VIII agencies’; such membership to be filled
by individual member states representing the agencies on a rotational
basis.
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ANNEX – REGIONALISM IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL: 
A VISION FOR 2010
This Annex explores the implications of introducing ‘security regionalism’ and
‘chapter VIII regional agencies’ for UN Security Council reform. In particular it
explores the potential improvement for Council legitimacy and authority that
might be gained by adopting the representative role of ‘chapter VIII regional
agencies’ (as advanced in section 7). 
One ‘chapter VIII regional agency’ would be assigned responsibility for its ‘secu-
rity region’ vis-à-vis the Council. The ‘security regions’, the ‘chapter VIII agen-
cies’, and the corresponding composition of the Security Council membership
are apparent in the tables below.
Table A1 (page 45) shows the current Council membership of 15 States based
on the current electoral mechanism, compared with an enlarged Council of 24
States in Tables B (page 45) and C (page 46). Table B is based on the two models
offered by the UN High-Level Panel, while Table C is based on the ‘chapter VIII
regional agency’ mechanism advanced in this paper.
Two criteria are employed for each ‘security region’:
• the ‘regional state spread’ (RSS), i.e. the range in the number of
regional States per Council seat for each region; 
• the ‘regional population spread’ (RPS), i.e. the range in the average
population size for each Council seat for each region.
Council Expansion from 15 to 24 Members
The implications of the criteria are far-reaching. The comparison shows that,
compared with the present Security Council that was elected for 2004 under the
current electoral group mechanism, considerable improvements will be achieved
1. For the purpose of analysis, Table A shows the current membership based on the postulated
eight ‘security regions’, not reflecting the current electoral mechanism of five groupings observed in
the UN since 1963 (viz. Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Western European & Others, and Latin
American/Caribbean).
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in both the RSS and the RPS if the Council is expanded to 24 members. Specif-
ically:
• the number of States per seat improves from 13 (Table A) to 8 (Tables
B and C); 
• the RSS improves from 19 States today (Table A) to 12 in the case of
eight regions in Table C; and improves further to 3.5 in the case of
four regions in Table B; and 
• the population per seat improves from 411 million (Table A) to 257
million (Tables B and C);
• the RPS improves from 1.35 billion today (Table A) to 476 million
with the Panel’s two models (Table B) and, even better, to 385 m. in
the case of the eight ‘security regions’. 
Regional Implications of Four and Eight ‘Regions’
The comparisons are more complicated between the UN Panel’s two models
(Table B) and the eight ‘security regions proposed in this paper (Table C). Spe-
cifically:
• In the Panel’s scenario, Asia-Pacific is disadvantaged through having
an average population per Council seat of 612 m. compared with the
other three regions whose populations are closely grouped around
140 m.. When eight ‘security regions’ are identified, Asia-Pacific is
offered a more democratic representation (with East Asia at 494 m.
and South Asia at 343 m., compared with other regions ranging from
109 m. to 281 m.);
• The RSS has a greater range in the case of eight regions because the
number of East Asian and South Asian States is so few. But this is
compensated for by their huge population sizes, and it is the demo-
cratic dimension of the RPS that should carry greater import in Coun-
cil representation.
Cultural and Strategic Implications of ‘Regionality’
In addition to the statistical dimension identified above, the cultural and strate-
gic considerations are of critical importance. The Panel’s four regions take no
account of the existing regional organizations – with a number of such agencies
being included within the Asia-Pacific region. With only four large regions iden-
tified, there is no indication as to any sub-regional allocation. Nor does it accord
recognition to the cultural and institutional fact of the Arab world.
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In comparison, the eight regions advanced in this paper adopt the same regional
identification for Africa, Europe and the Americas (and by implication regional
agencies); but also perceives Asia-Pacific to be composed of an additional five
rather than one region and agency. In this way, the strategic and cultural aspects
of the Arab world, and Central, South, East and South-east Asia plus the Pacific
are taken into account. There is, nonetheless, still scope for sub-regional alloca-
tion where appropriate.
Clearly, the various merits of the alternative models of security regionalism will
need to be thought through carefully over the next year. Whatever the final deci-
sions may be, it seems that ‘security regionalism’ will become a potent factor in
any future agreement on Security Council reform. Under the scenarios of eight
regions and agencies advanced in this paper, however, the influence of ‘security
regionalism’ is carried several steps further, based on the following considera-
tions:
• ‘Security regions’ would each have separate and distinct identity;
• Chapter VIII of the Charter would be given substantive meaning in
peace and security, commensurate with the increasing reliance now
being given to regional agencies;
• There would be no need for expanded permanent membership on a
national basis, since permanency for major States could be ensured on
a de facto manner through wider and more equitable regional repre-
sentation. 
• The ‘regional-global security mechanism’ envisioned by the UN Secre-
tary-General would gain realisation through an expanded Council
structured more formally along regional lines.
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Table A: Current Size (15 Members)
2004 Membership
Security Region
(S. R.)
Responsible 
Agency
S. R. Pop
(million)
No. of 
Regional 
States
No. of 
UNSC Seats
‘Regional Spread’: 
UNSC seats per P-5
States
per seat
Pop. per seat 
(m.)
Sub-Sahara
Africa AU 643 43 2 21.5 322
North Africa-
West Asia LAS 289 21 1 21 289
Europe COEa 643 41 5 8.2 129 France, UK
Central Asia -
Caucasia CIS 218 9 1 9 218 Russia
South Asia SAARC 1,373 7 1 7 1,373
East Asiab 1,481 5 1 5 1,481 China
Southeast Asia /
Pacific
ASEAN / 
PIFc 561 24 1 24 561
Americas OAS 847 35 3 11.7 282 USA
Unattached 110 6 --
Total/average 6,165 191 15 12.7 411 5
RSSd 19
RPS 1,352
a. Excluding Russia and the three Caucasian states
b. For representation purposes at the UN, Taiwan is not seen as a UN constituent Member State.
c. Excluding Cook Islands and Niue, not being UN Member States (whose combined populations total some
22,000).
d. These ranges reflect absolute differences only, between maximum and minimum figures.
Table B: Expanded Size (24 members)
Models A and B Presented by the UN HLP 
Security 
Region 
(S. R.)
Responsible 
Agencya
S. R. Pop. 
(million)
No. of 
Regional 
States
No. of 
UNSC Seats
‘Regional Spread’:
UNSC seats per Permanent Members
States 
per seat
Pop. per 
seat (m.)
Model A
P5+P6
Model BP5 
only
Africa 832 53 6 8,8 139 2 0 P + 2 SP
Asia and the 
Pacific 3673 56 6 9,3 612 3 - China 
+ 2 China + 2 SP
Europe
813 47 6 7,8 136 4 - Fr, UK, 
Russia + 1
France, UK 
& Russia 
+ 2 SP
Americas 847 35 6 5,8 141 2 - USA 
+ 1 USA + 2 SP
Unattached 0 --
Total/Average 6,165 191 24 8 257 11 5 P + 8 SP
RSS 3.5
RPS 476
a. The High Level Panel has not pursued the issue of responsible agency.
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Table C: Expanded Size (24 Members)
Based on 8 ‘Security Regions’ and ‘Chapter VIII Security Agencies’
Security Region 
(S. R.)
Responsible 
Agency
S. R. Pop.
(million)
No. of 
Regional 
States
No. of 
UNSC 
Seats ‘Regional Spread’ P-5
States per 
seat
Pop. Per 
seat (m.)
Sub-Sahara 
Africa AU 643 43 4 10.8 161
North Africa- 
West Asia LAS 289 21 2 10.5 145
Europe COEa 643 41 3 13.7 214 France, UK
Central Asia - 
Caucasia CIS 218 9 2 4.5 109 Russia
South Asia SAARC 1,373 7 4 1.8 343
East Asia 1,481 5 3 1.7 494 China
Southeast Asia / 
Pacific ASEAN / PIF 561 24 2 12.0 281
America OAS 847 35 4 8.8 212 USA
Unattached 110 6 -- --
Total/average 6,165 191 24 8 257 5
RSS 12.0
RPS 385
a. Excluding Russia and the three Caucasian states 
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